Page 2 of 2 Russia-India ties sour in Central Asia
By Peter Lee
Up to a point, Russia has been able to enlist India - now firmly committed to
the civilization-versus-terror narrative courtesy of its burgeoning partnership
with the US - in endorsing this world view.
Russia and India share a convergence of strategic interests in Afghanistan, one
that conflicts with China's desire to let the Pashtuns sort things out in their
own bloody fashion under the watchful eye of Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence.
Russia hopes to leverage the Afghan crisis into an acceptance of Moscow's
security leadership by Stans vulnerable to Taliban-inspired Islamic militancy.
India recognizes any victory by pro-Pakistan Pashtun factions, Taliban or
otherwise, in Afghanistan
as a defeat for its efforts to distract and bedevil Pakistan.
This shared interest was reflected in the joint statement of Manmohan and
President Dmitry Medvedev, which used the rhetoric of terrorism to preclude
negotiating with the Taliban insurgency - the unacknowledged centerpiece of the
US strategy to cobble together a political settlement and depart the benighted
region.
The communique stated:"[Russia and India] agree that the fight against
terrorism cannot be selective, and drawing false distinctions between 'good'
and 'bad' Taliban would be counter-productive."
But a meaningful alliance between Russia and India appears to founder on the
collision between Moscow's crude anti-diplomacy and India's ineffectual and
opportunistic outreach. Their divergence of interests is neatly illustrated in
the determined dance of the two powers with the tiny republic of Tajikistan.
Tajikistan borders Afghanistan to the north. The Tajik ethnic group disregards
the artificial border and dominates northwestern Afghanistan, including the
Ferghana Valley, the legendary bulwark of the anti-Pashtun, anti-Taliban Tajik
leader and Russian asset, Ahmad Shah Massoud.
Russia relied on Tajikistan to provide a logistical rear area for its support
of the Northern Alliance during the period of Taliban domination. India pitched
in by constructing a military hospital at the town of Farkhor in Tajikistan
territory a scant two kilometers from the Afghan border. Massoud, mortally
wounded by an al-Qaeda hit squad, died at the hospital two days before the
September 11, 2001 attacks.
Now, Tajikistan is the new hotspot in the global "war on terror" as it forms
the centerpiece of US Central Command commander General David Petraeus' efforts
to support the Afghan surge with a new supply route - the Northern Distribution
Network (NDN) - bypassing Pakistan - and bringing an ocean of cash,
development, graft and trouble to the impoverished mountain republic.
Tajikistan security has deteriorated markedly as militants fleeing the Pakistan
government crackdown in Waziristan have found refuge in Tajikistan's vulnerable
border regions. Tajikistan's Taliban problems have also been exacerbated by the
movement of militants to Afghanistan's previously peaceful northern border
districts to attack the NDN.
In addition to the US and NATO, Russia and India sense opportunity in
Tajikistan, giving the local boss, Emomali Rahmon, a chance to play off one
interested party against the other and settle old scores - and reveal the
fragility of the strategic partnership between Russia and India in Central
Asia.
After the US-led invasion, India maintained its presence at Farkhor and, in a
virtually unreported development, quietly negotiated terms in 2002 for its
first significant military base outside India, at the Ayni airport on the
outskirts of Tajikistan's capital of Dushanbe.
India's ubiquitous quasi-military Border Roads Organization - which
increasingly finds itself operating beyond India's borders in places like
Afghanistan - went to work expanding Ayni's runway. Stories were floated to
anxious observers in Beijing and Islamabad that India would station helicopters
or even MiG fighters at Ayni in order to project its power into the remote
corners of Central Asia.
The catch was that Ayni would be operated in rotation by Russia, India and
Tajikistan, and the Indian Air Force would be reliant on Russia's good offices
and logistical support to maintain its presence.
In 2007, an Indian defense website reported:
The Russians have given
India the option of sending a squadron of Mi-17 helicopters to Ayni, with a
detachment of pilots and support personnel. With Russia and Uzbekistan just
next door, logistics support has been assured. Russia has also offered to build
fighter maintenance infrastructure at Ayni with India. The option will be made
available to India to base a squadron of MiG-29 fighters at the base, but this
will not be in the near future, though the implications of this are huge -
Indian fighters can be scrambled at a moment's notice for operations anywhere
in the area. With mid-air refuelling support promised by the Russians, their
reach will be immense.
But what Russia giveth, it taketh away.
Russia has been eyeing India's rapprochement with the US with considerable
jealousy and anxiety. It apparently also covets Ayni (and the runway improved
by India) as a platform for its own aircraft, so the Russian-backed security
collective, the CSTO, can make a statement of its importance in the suddenly
significant northern Afghan theater.
Last September, India apparently tried to bypass its putative partner, Russia,
and play its own bilateral hand in Tajikistan. India's President Pratihba Patil
paid an unprecedented visit to Tajikistan to talk up potential economic, aid,
security links and India's interest in Ayni.
However, reports indicate that Tajikistan, responding to some combination of
Russian resentment, Chinese objections, and insufficient bribery, decided to
evict 150 Indian military engineers, support staff, and trainers from Ayni.
Russia's desire to demonstrate its leverage over its putative strategic partner
seems to have been decisive.
An Indian defense website picked up a report from the News Post India:
"This
[Russian pressure] appears to be a ploy for more concessions and indulgence
from India," a senior military officer associated with the Central Asian Region
said. Its Moscow's way of telling New Delhi not to "stray" into the American
military hardware camp, the official told IANS.
India annually conducts defense business of over $1.5 billion [...] with
Russia, and since the 1960s has acquired Soviet and Russian military equipment
worth over $30 billion.
Over the next decade, military planners anticipate purchases of over $40
billion to replace or upgrade India's predominantly Soviet and Russian defense
equipment that have reached collective obsolescence.
Moscow is understandably anxious to encash this potential and is wary of
competition from other suppliers, particularly the US, in support of IAF's
latest requirement of 126 multi-role combat aircraft.
Alongside, India is deadlocked in delicate discussions with Russia wanting to
renegotiate its $85 billion Sukhoi 30MkI multi-role fighter deal by demanding a
higher price for the timely delivery of the combat aircraft with the agreed
specifications.
In July, reportedly at the behest of a seemingly "displeased" Moscow, Tajik
Foreign Minister Hamrahon Zaripov declared that Dushanbe was not negotiating
with New Delhi about permitting India a military base at Ayni.
As
the US demonstrated in its convoluted but ultimately successful (and expensive)
efforts to forestall eviction from its airbase at Manas Airport in Kyrgyzstan,
even apparently hopeless situations can be turned around through the right
combination of concessions to Russia and payoffs to the local potentate.
So India might still find a precarious foothold for its air force in
Tajikistan, but it will remain beholden to the support of its unpopular Russian
patron for its continued presence.
It is not surprising that Russia's heavy-handed approach to Central Asia
security, India's aspirations, and military sales has forestalled a genuine
strategic partnership between Moscow and New Delhi that will counter the "soft
power" outreach of Beijing through the SCO.
While acknowledging seemingly every international organization that engages
India - or, like the SCO, resists India's determined efforts to engage with it
- the December Russia-India communique made no mention of Russia's pet
geopolitical projects: the European Security Treaty or the CTSO.
However, for the time being New Delhi seems bereft of its own strategy and
resources for advancing its independent interests in Central Asia.
As long as India continues to rely on its equivocal relationship as an
auxiliary to Russia and, increasingly, the US in their great power machinations
in Central Asia, it is likely that India and Russia will keep spinning their
gears as China and the SCO continue to move ahead.
Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection
with US foreign policy.
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