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    Central Asia
     Nov 13, 2009
Page 2 of 2
The rise of Rimland?
By Robert M Cutler

The names of its representatives are well known: Algeria's Ahmed Ben Bella, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, Indonesia's Sukarno, and others. Iraq's Saddam was the last.

So this half-century mark seems indicative, but of what? One reason it begins to stand out so clearly is that other things begun about 50 years ago are also coming full circle. Although the Sino-Soviet split can be traced to Joseph Stalin's wrong-headed revolutionary strategy in China between the two world wars, nevertheless it was in the early 1960s, following Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin, that the split became public and undeniable to all but a few.

The Sino-Soviet split in turn made possible the US-China rapprochement inaugurated by president Richard Nixon; and while in the early 1970s a commonly used phrase was Nixon, by going

  
to Beijing in 1972, had "played the China card [against Russia]", China is today increasingly able to play the Russian card against the US as well as the American card against Russia. Within the past decade, China signed its first treaty with Russia in the last half-century, and one that includes the classic phrase "Good-Neighborly Relations" in the title.

Today, in one of those impossible-to-invent scenarios, China finds itself perfectly positioned to take advantage of the synergy between (1) Russia's need for export markets for hydrocarbon energy, where Europe is slow-growth and East Asia is accelerating; and (2) its own surplus of US dollars with which to purchase and invest in a discount shopping mart of world-economic crisis-depressed industries.

So what has this to do with Iraq? And who was Nicolas Spykman? Spykman (1893-1943) was a Dutch-born American professor of international relations at Yale University who took English geographer Sir Halford John Mackinder's idea of the Heartland being surrounded by an Inner Crescent (comprising Europe, Arabia, the wider Middle East and Asia), criticized and internally differentiated the crescent, distinguishing in Asia, for example, between the spaces occupied by Indian and by Chinese civilizations. He renamed it the Rimland, and turned Mackinder on his head by asserting that "who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia ... [and consequently] the destinies of the world".

On a map, the Rimland outside Europe looked at the time as if it were unified by little other than the British Empire. Yet it is not for nothing that Spykman is sometimes called the "godfather" of (George F Kennan's) "containment theory". His Rimland is meant to contain Mackinder's Heartland. And that is where the before-our-very-eyes shift in Iraqi energy and foreign commercial policy achieves its world-historical significance.

The Iraqi energy contracts would be impossible without the political security of the Turkish-Iraqi rapprochement. (Some have even suggested the word "integration".) That rapprochement mends a broken link in the Rimland.

The main winners in this shift are the corporate descendents of the British and American companies that were part of the TPC 80 years ago (but not only them). The main losers are the others: France and Russia; although the latter was not a player early last century, it become one during the 1960s in concert with the French.

Although industrial trusts these days dictate states' foreign policy more than the other way around, it is possible to see, in the co-opting of Chinese and other Asian energy companies to these projects, a pattern whereby the North Atlantic powers and the North Pacific powers cooperate against the powers of Mackinder's Eurasian Heartland.

It bears mentioning that the North Atlantic powers are not limited to the US and the United Kingdom, but also include Norway (by way of StatOilHydro), Italy (by way of Eni), and other smaller European state companies, just as smaller Asian state companies are also included: Japan, Indonesia and South Korea, for example; not to mention (once again) China.

These are companies that were not players when the "game" began a century ago because they did not have the educated technicians, industrial plant and access to capital that a century of social and economic evolution has now brought them.

Those North Atlantic powers even include Germany, which is not present in the region's oil patch but whose national champion RWE is the moving force (along with Austria's OMV) in promoting the Nabucco pipeline: which, recall from above, the new Turkish-Iraqi cooperation is helping to fill with gas from Iraqi Kurdistan.

Such is the emerging macro-structure that will govern international relations for the next decade and a half, until it becomes clear what is the outcome of the ongoing turmoil in Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and (sooner or later) Uzbekistan. For those countries represent a geographical wedge that could divide the Rimland in two.

But even Russia surely knows that their eruption in mass social unrest would not necessarily be to the advantage of any Eurasian land power; such an eruption would constitute itself a new Eurasian land power, transnational and trans-societal in scope. Such changes have already made inroads among the Muslim peoples of Russia's North Caucasus. This does not stop Russia today from preventing concerted action against Iran in the UN Security Council (even though one of the best ways to understand present-day Iran is to study the history of the Safavid Empire of the 16th and 17th centuries).

This is not any anti-French or even anti-Russian plot. According to George Liska, the European-born American theorist of international relations, the "structure of international relations" comports ever-changing triangles, spanning the centuries, among land and sea powers whose strategies are determined as much by geography as by anything else.

Any seafaring North Atlantic and the North Pacific powers would have common interests vis-a-vis any Eurasian land power. It is Spykman's Rimland against Mackinder's Heartland, although in the details it is much more complicated than that.

It will take until the early 2020s before we will have a better idea about the resolution or irresolution of the social eruption in the "wedge" identified above. That outcome will in turn condition the evolution of the first post-Cold War international system's third phase (we now live on the cusp of the second), until a crisis in the early 2040s may lead to a system-wide transformation that we cannot yet well imagine.

Dr Robert M Cutler (http://www.robertcutler.org), educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The University of Michigan, has researched and taught at universities in the United States, Canada, France, Switzerland, and Russia. Now senior research fellow in the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, Canada, he also consults privately in a variety of fields.

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