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possible, even though their own policies in Afghanistan are the worst possible
example of a murderous neo-colonial regime." [8]
Izvestia continued the tirade:
Mass killings of the civilian population
by the American army such as bombing wedding and funeral processions, extending
the fighting to Pakistan and dragging it into Afghanistan's internal ethnic and
political feud - all these and similar actions, which have been without any
social or commercial investment in Afghanistan, threaten the whole world,
Russia included.
The Afghans, sick and tired of the pointless presence of foreign military
forces, have asked Russia to restore its clear-cut peaceful Afghan policy. A
delegation of influential Afghan politicians will arrive in Moscow to attend
the May 14 Russian-Afghan forum. The group mainly includes Pashtun leaders, who
have shaped the country's political and state backbone for centuries. They are
convinced that the way to peace and settlement in Afghanistan will depend on
Russia's policy.
CSTO to counter NATO
Does all this add up to the SCO becoming a military alliance?
This is a question that has come up frequently during the past decade. It still
refuses to go away. There has been even some degree of characterization of the
SCO at times as an "Asian NATO". But the answer is a firm "no'. The plain truth
is that neither China nor Russia would be comfortable for the foreseeable
future with the idea of a military alliance between them, although both have
shared concerns over the US agenda for NATO's eastward expansion.
Besides, we should not overlook that Central Asian countries also have their
own so-called "multi-vector" foreign policy, which places primacy on national
autonomy and independence that precludes the possibility of their becoming part
of a military bloc as such.
At any rate, Uzbekistan, the maverick of them all but a key country all the
same in regional security, will forever keep everyone guessing whether its mind
is on the same thing that it speaks about at any given time, or whether its
actions are going to be in conformity with its own words. Tashkent stayed out
of the SCO exercises in April in Tajikistan. It is right now having a slinging
match with Kyrgyz border guards about recent incidents of violence in the
Ferghana Valley.
However, Moscow has been steadily working on another option. The CSTO -
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia Uzbekistan and Tajikistan - is
transforming into a full-blooded military alliance. "The National Security
Strategy of the Russian Federation Until 2020", which was recently approved by
Medvedev, says that Moscow views the CSTO as the key instrument to counter
regional challenges, and political and military threats. The document says
pointedly that the struggle for energy resources in the Caspian and Central
Asia may conceivably lead to armed conflicts.
The special summit meeting of the CSTO held in February in Moscow decided to
set up a collective rapid-response force to help bloc members to repulse
aggression or to meet any emergency. Moscow has been focusing for some time on
the strengthening of the CSTO and recent strides in this direction are a major
foreign-policy success for the Kremlin. No doubt, the impetus is to keep "third
countries" out of Central Asia. Medvedev has said that the rapid-reaction force
"will be just as good or comparable to NATO forces". The CSTO's joint
rapid-reaction force will hold military exercises in August-September in
Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus.
The force will comprise an airborne division and an air assault brigade from
Russia, and an air assault brigade from Kazakhstan. The other CSTO members
(except Uzbekistan) will contribute a battalion-size force each. To quote a
Russian expert, "A collective rapid-reaction force will give CSTO a quick tool,
leaving no time for third parties to intervene." [9]
"The rapid-response force is a major but so far only one of the first steps
toward creating a powerful military political organization," he added. Indeed,
Kommersant newspaper broke the news on May 29 that Russia was planning to build
a strong military contingent in Central Asia within the framework of the CSTO,
which will be comparable to NATO forces in Europe. "Work is being conducted in
all areas, and a number of documents have been adopted," the report said,
quoting Russian Foreign Ministry sources.
The unnamed Russian official said, "It will be a purely military structure,
built to ensure security in Central Asia in case of an act of aggression." It
will include armored and artillery units and a naval flotilla in the Caspian
Sea, according to the CSTO spokesman. The Russian news agency Novosti reported
that the new force would comprise large military units from five countries -
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It commented, "The
creation of a powerful military contingent in Central Asia reflects Moscow's
drive to make the CSTO a pro-Russian military bloc, rivaling NATO forces in
Europe."
Interestingly, a summit meeting of the CSTO is scheduled for Moscow on Sunday
on the eve of the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg. The million-dollar question is
the co-relation, if any, between the CSTO and the SCO summits in the scheme of
things in Moscow and Beijing. The political and diplomatic symbolism in the
timing of the two summits on successive days cannot be lost on observers. There
has been some talk that the CSTO and the SCO would eventually have an
institutionalized back-to-back relationship of sorts. (All the SCO member
countries except China are also CSTO members.)
Conceivably, Moscow and Beijing have been exchanging views on the CSTO's
emergence as a coherent military bloc in Central Asia, with which China shares
thousands of kilometers of border. What seems to be happening is that China
tacitly welcomes the Russian initiative to build up the CSTO's capabilities as
a military setup. At the very least, Beijing isn't doing anything to dampen
Russia's enthusiasm, let alone counter the Russian move through countervailing
steps. There could be several factors at work here.
One, any strengthening of security in Central Asia also benefits China. Two, to
the extent that the CSTO becomes a bulwark against any NATO expansion into
Central Asia, it also works to China's advantage. Three, Moscow's determination
to stand up to the US's containment strategy serves Beijing's purpose. Four,
the CSTO's build-up means the consolidation of Central Asian countries, which
precludes opportunities for the US to expand its influence in the region, let
alone roll back Russian and Chinese influence.
Five, the emergence of the CSTO in Central Asia virtually forecloses any future
US attempts to place elements of its missile defense system in the border
regions of China close to the Xinjiang autonomous region, where China has
located important missile sites. Finally, the CSTO harbors no animus against
China insofar as all the CSTO members except Armenia and Belarus are in any
case SCO members. China's rapidly expanding influence in Central Asia ensures
that the bulk of the CSTO countries will have high stakes in friendly relations
with Beijing.
Thus, an intriguing security paradigm is developing in Central Asia.
Quintessentially, the SCO will keep shying away from becoming a military bloc.
This is not feigned posturing. It is real. At the same time, in political
terms, the SCO is the facilitator of a regional security understanding that is
leading to the full-blooded evolution of the CSTO as an anti-NATO military
bloc.
Arguably, in the absence of the SCO, Moscow and Beijing would have to invent
such a body. For, without the SCO, any such formation under Moscow's leadership
of a NATO-like military bloc shaping up right on China's sensitive border
regions would have been simply unthinkable.
Notes
1. Marina Zavada and Yuriy Kulikov, "Yevgeniy Primakov", Autopilot Does Not
Work in a Crisis, Izvestia, May, 8, 2009.
2. According to the data from the US Energy Information Administration, the
three “Stans” of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan - have
more than 7 trillion cbm of proven gas reserves, or around 4% of the global
share, and much of the has hasn’t yet been harvested. The "Stans" have
committed much of their harvestable gas to Russia and China through the next
decade.
3. S Adam Cardais, "Central Asian Gas Not a Panacea for Europe", Business Week,
February 3, 2009.
4. Dr Martha Brill Olcott, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Changing the
Playing Field in Central Asia", testimony before the Helsinki Commission,
September 26, 2006.
5. "NATO invites Kazakhstan to join Afghan peacekeeping operation",
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May, 14, 2009.
6. Significantly, the next round of the SCO joint military exercises will be
held in 2010 in southern Kazakhstan.
7. "Interview with Stephen F Cohen on US-Russia Relations", Washington Profile,
April 2009.
8. "Afghanistan: Russia’s chance to influence global politics again", Izvestia,
May 13, 2009. 9. Ilya Kramnik, "CSTO: joining forces in a crisis", RIA Novosti,
February 5, 2009.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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