Russia's military reform plan falters
By Roger N McDermott
As the Russian state's concerns grow over the political risks to the regime
presented by the current economic crisis, President Dmitry Medvedev has assured
the military that an ambitious reform and modernization plan will be
implemented and given a key monitoring role to its main security organ.
Medvedev on February 23 re-affirmed the government's commitment to a plan that
would radically reform Russia's army and command structure, claiming that funds
will be be available for new weapons programs and improved social conditions
for the armed forces despite the global downturn.
"The army and the navy should be up to the level of today's threats. They
should be compact, mobile and technically
equipped. Despite all the difficulties of the current period, we shall do all
that is needed to ensure this," he said while addressing the military to mark
Defender of the Fatherland Day on February 23.
His pledge came as opposition to the reform programs is growing amongst
Russia's officers corps, which fears it may cost thousands of them their
positions.
Plans to reform the Russian military's structure and re-arm it with new weapons
were first announced by Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov in October 2008.
Russia's top military commander, First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of
General Staff General Nikolay Makarov said in November 2008 that the current
command structure - inherited from the Soviet era - was "cumbersome and
ineffective".
On February 19, Medvedev told tank divisions in Chita, eastern Siberia, that
Russia plans to increase cooperation with its allies in the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) - Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan - and to hold joint military exercises in the near
future. Moscow views this as significant in light of plans recently announced
to form a CSTO rapid-reaction force.
Medvedev also highlighted Russia's need to develop "efficient cooperation" with
the armed forces of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
In Chito, he invited the military district's commanders to discuss urgent tasks
and the modernization of the military as a whole. He told them that while
Russia had gone through a very difficult period in the 1990s, that the
achievements of more recent years would not be lost. "The situation is not easy
now either, especially in the conditions of the economic crisis," he said.
But Medvedev's assurances, and announcement of plans for joint exercises and
military cooperation, mask the faltering nature of the domestic military
modernization program.
Officer troubles
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the plans is the planned downsizing of
the officer corps, with reductions of up to 200,000 scheduled for the period
between 2009 and 2012.
Sensitivity over the reductions is linked to the potential of some officers
presenting political problems for the government after their removal from
service, and some officers have already reportedly made contact with opposition
groups. There is also a high level of uncertainty over how the cuts will be
managed.
On February 17, seemingly in an effort to allay pressure on Serdyukov over the
unpopular reforms, Makarov provided guarantees that there will be no dismissals
of officers in 2009-2010. "Only those who are being discharged due to long
service are subject to the reduction, and 40,000-45,000 unfilled posts," will
be affected, according to Makarov.
At some point Russia's Ministry of Defense will need to form a committee to
decide which officers will be discharged. The process has the potential to
create new sources of corruption, as officers may exploit links with other
power structures to remain in their positions. For the time being,
procrastination is the most politically expedient course.
Crime and corruption
Meanwhile, so-called "officer crime" is on the increase, according to Russia's
chief military prosecutor, Sergei Fridinsky. One in four crimes involving the
armed forces and other security departments in Russia last year were committed
by officers, causing over 2 billion rubles ($55.8 million) in losses, he said
on February 25.
Sergey Devyatov, the head of the military investigations directorate at the
Russian Prosecutor-General's Office in the Volga-Urals Military District, said
on February 18 that 75% of all crime committed by officers stems from
corruption, mostly committed by staff from enlistment offices assisting draft
dodgers. Three members of draft boards are currently under investigation for
allegations they helped 198 conscripts evade military service.
Procurement fraud has also cost the Volga-Urals Military District millions of
rubles, with contracted soldiers often deserting their units to escape salary
extortion, according to Devyatov. There are several recorded cases of
contracted personnel extorting money from each other, or officers extorting
from contract servicemen, as well as conscripts engaging in the practice.
Nonetheless, the timing of the release of the officer crime statistics does
seem calculated to reduce the level of outcry within the armed forces over
Serdyukov's unpopular reform plans.
Alongside the rising resentment to the reform plans in the officers corps,
plans to improve the housing conditions for servicemen have also run into
trouble. The purchase of 16,000 apartments for active and retired servicemen,
hoped to tackle acute accommodation shortages for officers and stimulate the
beleaguered housing construction market, was due to be completed by the end of
2008 at a cost of 32 billion rubles. To date, however, only around 3,000
apartments have been purchased.
The state and the construction companies will need to work harder if the
government wants to prevent this issue from emerging as another factor delaying
military reform.
New role for Russian intelligence
There are also clear signs of anxiety over the economic conditions facing the
Russian state as a result of the economic crisis, and its Federal Security
Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti - the FSB) has now been assigned a
central role in combating corruption in this context.
Medvedev announced in January that the FSB will now join the Emergencies
Ministry, the Prosecutor's Office, and United Russia - the major political
party in the Russian Federation - for on-going efforts to monitor state
spending and pre-empt threats to national security caused by the crisis.
On January 29, Medvedev outlined the new task for the FSB during an expanded
session of the FSB which, in addition to the president, was attended by
presidential administration head Sergey Naryshkin, Prosecutor-General Yuriy
Chayka, Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev, Supreme Court Chairman
Vyacheslav Lebedev, Deputy Prime Ministers Sergey Ivanov and Igor Sechin,
Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev, Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov,
Justice Minister Aleksandr Konovlov, and Foreign Intelligence Service Director
Sergey Lebedev.
Medvedev justified the decision based on the potential for corruption coupled
with the financial crisis to cripple the country's economy. "The situation in
the world is difficult now. Every measure is being taken by us to support the
banking, industrial, and construction sectors. The money needs to reach
consumers and it needs to be spent effectively," Medvedev said.
The FSB will now oversee funds allocated to the real estate and banking sectors
and closely follow spending within the defense industries. It is unclear how
the FSB will monitor the expenditure of state funds, but the economic crisis
has inadvertently, and greatly, extended its jurisdiction.
At the Emergencies Ministry additional rapid-reaction forces have been formed
and assigned anti-crisis tasks. Officially, the forces are on standby to
conduct search-and-rescue operations in conflict zones. However, given the fear
of possible social unrest caused by rising unemployment and the impact of the
financial crisis, these rapid-reaction forces may be earmarked for preventing
or neutralizing strikes and political rallies.
United Russia has been tasked with monitoring signs of rising anti-government
sentiment within industry and is reportedly forming a "white collar trade
union" to offset this risk.
In short, all the signs are that the Russian state is privately very concerned
about the political risks to the regime presented by the present economic
crisis. In this context the plans to reform and modernize the armed forces are
being slightly adjusted, not just in terms of time scale, but also in the
prominence given to the officials having to promote this agenda.
Among the powerful ministries and key government officials the main concern is
how to handle the integration of 200,000 officers into civilian life after the
cuts are complete. The financial crisis has compelled the authorities to draw
back from the brink, and handle this much more circumspectly.
Housing provision targets remain a hurdle to modernization plans. Improved
social conditions ranging from housing to pay hikes will be needed if the main
goal of transferring the army to permanent readiness is to be reached.
But at the moment the organs of power are concentrating not on implementing the
modernization of Russia's armed forces, but on plans to control or minimize the
social effects of the financial crisis which may pose a threat to Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin's construction of a "managed democracy".
Roger N McDermott is an honorary senior fellow, Department of Politics
and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK) specializing
in defense and security issues in Russia, Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
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