Page 2 of 2 Russia and Turkey tango in the Black Sea
By M K Bhadrakumar
pragmatism of Turkey's "Kemalist" foreign policy. (Ataturk reached out to the
Bolsheviks in the early 1920s.) Lavrov gently glided over the pages of
contemporary history. He said in Istanbul that post-Soviet Russia didn't feel
any "restraining factors" on account of Turkey's NATO membership as long as the
two powers remained "truly sincere, truly trustful and truly mutually
respectful". What did he mean?
From the Russian perspective, what matters is that Turkey shouldn't use its
NATO membership to the detriment of Russia's interests, even while legitimately
fulfilling its obligations and commitments to the alliance. In other words,
Lavrov reminded that
Turkey should not forget about its "other international commitments and
obligations", such as "the framework of the international treaties that govern
the regime on the Black Sea, for example".
Lavrov drew comfort that "Turkey never places its commitments to NATO above its
other international obligations, but always strictly follows all those
obligations that it has in the totality. This is a very important trait not
characteristic for all countries. We appreciate this, and endeavor to approach
our relations likewise." To be sure, he left behind much food for thought for
his Turkish hosts.
Caucasian chessboard
Meanwhile, to use Akyol's metaphor, a new "symphony" has indeed begun in the
Black Sea and Southern Caucasus. International observers, who reduce the
current discord to one of Russia's support to the principle of
self-determination, are counting the trees and missing the wood.
After testing out NATO's real capabilities to wage a war against Russia in the
Black Sea - a Russian military expert assessed Moscow would need 20 minutes to
sink the NATO fleet - Russia has announced its intent to deploy regular troops
in the newly independent states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia under the
treaties of "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" that Russia signed
with them in Moscow on Tuesday. Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said a
contingent in excess of a brigade each would be deployed in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.
In practical terms, Russia has reinforced its presence in the Black Sea region.
Lavrov explained in Moscow on Tuesday, "Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia will
take all possible measures jointly to remove and prevent threats to peace or
attempts to destroy peace and to counter acts of aggression against them on the
part of any country or any group of countries." He said Moscow would henceforth
expect that any discussions by the United Nations Security Council over
regional security issues would be "senseless" without the participation of the
representatives of South Ossetia and Abkhazia - a precondition Washington is
certain to reject.
Equally, another Russo-Turkish symphony is heard elsewhere in the Caucasus. On
Saturday, Turkish President Abdullah Gul flew into Yerevan, breaking the
century-old ice in Turkish-Armenian relations. Moscow encourages the thaw.
Yerevan hopes to benefit from the Russo-Turkish regional concord to normalize
relations with Ankara and reopen the Armenian-Turkish border after a gap of
almost a century. Armenian President Serge Sarkisian is expected to visit
Turkey on October 14. The back channels working quietly in Switzerland for
months are being elevated to a formal level. Pitfalls remain, especially with
regard to the complicated Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Again, Washington might get
alarmed and begin to pull strings through the Armenian diaspora in the US -
and, vice versa.
At any rate, Gul visited Baku, Azerbaijan, on Wednesday to brief the Azeri
leadership. In the same context, Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov
visited Moscow last weekend, following a telephone conversation between Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev and his Azerbaijan counterpart Ilkham Aliyev.
Medvedev invited Aliyev to visit Moscow. Armenian President Sarkisian recently
visited Moscow.
The Russian newspaper Kommersant cited a Kremlin source to report that Moscow
could broker an Armenian-Azeri summit meeting. If so, Russia and Turkey,
working in tandem, are effectively bypassing Europe and the US. The so-called
Minsk group of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe has to
date been in the driving seat of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.
(Interestingly, Russia is a member of the Minsk group, whereas Turkey stood
excluded.)
Baku snubs Cheney
To quote Kommersant, "Moscow and Ankara are consolidating their position in the
Caucasus, thus weakening Washington's influence there." The signs are already
there. When Cheney visited Baku last week on Wednesday on a mission
single-mindedly aimed at isolating Russia in the region, he came across a few
rude surprises.
The Azeris made a departure from their traditional hospitality to visiting US
leaders by accorded a low-level airport reception for Cheney. Further, Cheney
was kept cooling his heels for an entire day until Aliyev finally received him.
This was despite what Cheney always thought was his special personal chemistry
with the Azeri leader dating to his Halliburton days. (Aliyev used to head the
Azeri state-run oil company SOCRAM.)
Cheney ended up spending an entire day visiting the US Embassy in Baku and
conversing with sundry American oil executives working in Azerbaijan. Finally,
when Aliyev received him late in the evening, Cheney discovered to his
discomfiture that Azerbaijan was in no mood to gang up against Russia.
Cheney conveyed the George W Bush administration's solemn pledge to support the
US's allies in the region against Russia's "revanchism". He stated Washington's
determination in the current situation to punish Russia at any cost by pushing
the Nabucco gas pipeline project. But Aliyev made it clear he did not want to
be drawn into a row with Moscow. Cheney was greatly upset and made his
displeasure known by refusing to attend the Azeri state banquet in his honor.
Soon after the conversation with Cheney, Aliyev spoke to Medvedev on phone.
The Azeri stance demonstrates that contrary to US media propaganda, Russia's
firm stance in the Caucasus has enhanced its prestige and standing in the
post-Soviet space. The CSTO at its meeting in Moscow on September 5 strongly
endorsed the Russian position on the conflict with Georgia. Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin undertook a highly significant visit to Tashkent on
September 1-2 aimed at boosting Russian-Uzbek understanding on regional
security. Russia and Uzbekistan have tied up further cooperation in the field
of energy, including expansion of the Soviet-era gas pipeline system.
Kazakhstan, which openly supported Russia in the Caucasus situation, is mulling
its oil companies acquiring assets in Europe jointly with Russia's Gazprom. The
indications are that Tajikistan has agreed to an expansion of the Russian
military presence in Tajikistan, including the basing of its strategic bombers.
Indeed, the CSTO's endorsement of the recent Russian package of proposals on
developing a (post-NATO) European treaty on security is a valuable diplomatic
gain for Moscow at this juncture.
But in tangible terms, what gives utmost satisfaction to Moscow is that
Azerbaijan has reacted to the Caucasus tensions and the temporary closure of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by pumping its oil exports to Europe instead
via the Soviet-era Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. The dramatic irony of Baku
overnight switching from a US-sponsored oil pipeline bypassing Russia to a
Soviet-era pipeline that runs through the Russian heartland couldn't have been
lost on Cheney.
More worrisome for Washington is the Russian proposal that lies on Aliyev's
table offering that Moscow will be prepared to buy all of Azerbaijan's gas at
world market prices - an offer Western oil companies cannot possibly match. It
is an offer Baku will seriously consider against the backdrop of the new
regional setting.
The complete failure of Cheney's mission to Baku would appear to have come as a
rude awakening to Washington that Moscow has effectively blunted the Bush
administration's gunboat diplomacy in the Black Sea. As the New York Times
newspaper grimly assessed on Tuesday,"“The Bush administration, after
considerable internal debate, has decided not to take direct punitive action
[against Russia] ... concluding it has little leverage if it acts unilaterally
and that it would be better off pressing for a chorus of international
criticism to be led by Europe."
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained to the daily that Washington
prefers a long-term strategic approach, " [and] not one where we act reactively
in a way that has negative consequences". He added thoughtfully, "If we act too
precipitously, we could be the ones who are isolated." Cheney himself has
scaled down his earlier rhetoric to severely punish Russia. He now thinks the
door for improving relations with Russia must remain open, and casting future
relations with the US is a choice for the leaders in Moscow to make.
But Turkey appears to have made its choice. From the speed with which Erdogan
conjured up the idea of the Caucasus Stability Pact, it seems Turkey was ready
for it for a while already. It is not as easy as it appears to invariably turn
factors of geography and history to geopolitical advantage. Besides, as its
misleading name suggests, the Black Sea is actually an iridescent blue sea full
of playful dolphins, but pirates and sailors were captivated by its dark
appearance when the sky hung low laden with storm clouds.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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