Ukraine adds to Moscow's
setbacks By Dr Michael A Weinstein
Over the past two months, Moscow's geostrategy
has suffered serious setbacks in Ukraine and Abkhazia, a
mini-state on the Black Sea that broke away from Georgia
in 1993 and which has since been dependent for its
existence on Russian support.
The guiding aim of
President Vladimir Putin's geostrategy is to restore
Moscow's influence over its periphery, which it lost
after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Putin
regime envisions a trade and security alliance that
would incorporate some of the republics of the former
Soviet Union in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern
Europe, in which Russia would be the dominant power.
Moscow pursues its goal by trying to promote and
cultivate friendly governments in the target states.
Wherever Moscow attempts to reassert its
influence, it meets with opposition from the
Euro-American alliance, which has the strategic aim of
incorporating Russia's periphery - especially in Eastern
Europe and the Caucasus - into the Western system of
market democracies. If Ukraine tilted westward, it would
be a candidate for admission to the European Union and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). If
Abkhazia were to be reabsorbed into Georgia, Moscow
would lose one of its important footholds in the
Transcaucasus to a pro-Western state.
The Putin
regime has responded to its persistent structural
conflict with the West by taking a proactive approach
toward the political systems of its target states and
dependencies. In Ukraine and Abkhazia, Moscow has most
notably attempted to influence the outcomes of
presidential elections overtly through Putin's
endorsements of favored candidates and by sending in
political operatives to strategize and support those
candidates.
In both cases, Moscow's tactics have
backfired; it has not been able to overcome internal
divisions within the target states and it has awakened
resistance in electorates to outside influence,
resulting in disputed elections that have brought
endemic conflicts to a head and, in Abkhazia's case,
institutional failure. Through overplaying its hand,
Moscow now finds itself threatened with a permanent loss
of influence in Eastern Europe and the Transcaucasus.
The crisis over Ukraine's disputed presidential
election has intensified, with the key eastern province
of Donetsk calling a referendum on autonomy and the
opposition demanding that President Leonid Kuchma fire
his prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, the official
winner of last week's vote that has bitterly divided the
former Soviet republic. On Saturday, Ukraine's
parliament declared the election invalid amid
international calls for a new vote, and lawmakers also
passed a vote of no confidence in the Central Elections
Commission, which declared Moscow-backed Yanukovych the
winner. Opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko, who claims
he was cheated out of victory in the presidential
runoff, has urged his supporters to stay in the streets.
The situation in Abkhazia, meanwhile, is
particularly revealing, because the small country with a
quarter-million people shows in microcosm how even a
society that is radically dependent on Moscow and is
pro-Russian will resist its protector when it feels that
it is subject to undue pressure.
Abkhazia's
disputed election Until its first contested
presidential election on October 3, Abkhazia was ruled
by strong man Vladislav Ardzinba, who had followed an
unwavering pro-Moscow line. Unrecognized by any state,
including Russia, Ardzinba's regime was subject to an
economic blockade by Georgia and was only able to
survive through the presence of Russian "peacekeepers"
who kept the Georgian military at bay.
During
Ardzinba's tenure, Abkhazia's economy collapsed, leaving
half the country's working-age population unemployed.
Criminal activity became rampant and corruption and
cronyism were rife within the state bureaucracies.
Nonetheless, when it came time to replace the aging
Ardzinba, Moscow hit on a plan of contested elections,
which it calculated would result in the victory of its
favorite, Raul Khajimba, an ex-KGB agent and the
incumbent prime minister, and would have the added
benefit of conferring a modicum of legitimacy on the
mini-state, which would strengthen its position in any
future deal with Georgia or pave the way to some
regularized and permanent form of separation.
From all appearances, the Abkhazian elections
seemed to be a win-win situation for Moscow. All five
candidates were pledged to maintain Abkhazia's special
relation with Russia. Indeed, they could not do
otherwise: the civil war of 1992-1993 had resulted in
the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian half of the
country's population, leaving its ethnic Abkhaz,
Armenian and Russian components completely dependent on
Moscow for protection against an irredentist Georgia,
which gained enhanced Western backing after the
2003-2004 Rose Revolution.
Despite the fact that
Russian interests were not likely to be impaired whoever
won the presidential election, Putin made it clear that
he endorsed Khajimba by meeting with him and no other
candidate, and posing with him for a photograph that
became an icon of the campaign. Moscow also dispatched
operatives to plan and support Khajimba's campaign.
To the surprise of Moscow and political
analysts, Putin's efforts to manipulate the election had
the opposite of their intended effect. Opposition
candidate Sergei Bagapsh, running on a platform of
continued ties with Russia and promises of an anti-crime
and anti-corruption administration, won slightly more
than 50% of the vote (44,002) to Khajimba's 30,815
votes, with the other candidates splitting the rest.
Analysts attributed Bagapsh's unexpected showing
to widespread public resentment against Abkhazia's
corrupt political system and Moscow's efforts to
perpetuate it. The slogan "we can decide ourselves"
appeared on the streets, signaling popular defiance of
Moscow.
Although Abkhazia's Central Electoral
Commission certified Bagapsh's victory, the election was
clouded by charges of irregularities and an
unconstitutional revote in the Gali district, to which
Bagapsh and Khajimba agreed. When the Central Electoral
Commission met to reach its decision on October 6 and
11, supporters of Bagapsh occupied the building where it
was deliberating, setting a precedent of direct action
that would be repeated over the coming weeks by both
sides, finally eventuating in institutional failure and
political paralysis.
Institutional
failure Despite having agreed to the revote in
Gali, Khajimba did not accept the commission's verdict
and sued to have the vote overturned by the country's
Supreme Court. On October 28, after having heard
testimony that Bagapsh supporters had threatened
commissioners during their deliberations, the court
declared the commission's decision to be valid. On
learning of the court's verdict, Khajimba's supporters
seized the court building and held the judges hostage
until they reversed their decision and replaced it with
a ruling ordering the Central Electoral Commission to
set up a revote. On October 29, incumbent President
Ardzinba issued a decree requiring new elections,
setting the stage for a downward spiral to institutional
failure.
In quick succession, Bagapsh's forces
took over the state television and Khajimba's sealed off
parliament, in which Bagapsh supporters have a majority,
to prevent it from declaring Ardzinba's decree
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, the Central Electoral
Commission refused to meet to plan new elections and
Ardzinba replaced Khajimba as prime minister with former
Russian ministry of emergency situations operative Nodar
Khashba, a Moscow loyalist. With different
institutions under the control of opposing factions,
Abkhazia's political system became paralyzed as neither
candidate proved willing to compromise, despite repeated
negotiations. Bagapsh insisted that he would be
inaugurated on December 6, whereas Khajimba demanded a
revote.
The stand off spiraled out of control on
November 12 when, during a large rally of Bagapsh
supporters, a group of them seized control of the
government complex in Abkhazia's capital Sukhumi,
including the president's office, supposedly to allow
Bagapsh to set up his new administration. In the
commotion, 78-year-old Tamara Sharkyl - a linguist,
human-rights advocate and respected Abkhaz nationalist -
was killed by a ricocheting bullet fired by Ardzinba's
presidential guard.
At the urging of Bagapsh,
his supporters left the government complex, but remained
outside it, preventing official business from being
conducted there. Since then, the tensions have deepened.
After Bagapsh supporters brought two presidential guards
to the prosecutor's office in connection with Sharkyl's
death, security forces loyal to Ardzinba launched a
commando raid on the office and freed them, setting off
a chain of events leading to a "declaration of
disobedience" by 2,000 police officers who vowed to
refuse to follow orders from the government.
Throughout the deepening tensions, Moscow
supported Ardzinba, Khashba and Khajimba, refusing to
concede anything to Bagapsh. On November 12, Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Alexander
Yakovenko placed Moscow's support behind the Ardzinba
regime and threatened Russian intervention: "If the
situation continues to follow the illegal track, the
Russian side will have to protect its interests. In
Abkhazia one and all should know that all responsibility
for the likely effects will be placed on Bagapsh and his
followers."
Not only did Moscow's hard line fail
to break the resolve of the Bagapsh faction; it also
provoked a strong response from Tbilisi, which regards
Abkhazia as part of Georgia. Despite the failure of its
assertive posture, Moscow has continued to try to exert
pressure, redeploying some of its peacekeepers from
Abkhazia's Georgian border toward Sukhumi and
temporarily closing crossings along Abkhazia's border,
threatening to impede Abkhazia's citrus harvest from
going to market.
With Moscow taking one side in
the election dispute and Abkhazian state institutions
divided and deadlocked, a last attempt at conflict
resolution was undertaken by the Council of Elders, an
extra-constitutional public body of clan and local
leaders. When the council met in Sukhumi on November 20,
its proceedings were disrupted by an invasion of 100 old
people bussed in by the Bagapsh camp. The meeting was
quickly called off after a decision was made to
reconvene the council with new membership.
On
November 23, the council met again and declared that
Bagapsh should assume the presidency and that he and
Khajimba should form a team. Earlier, Bagapsh had
offered Khajimba the posts of prime minister or vice
president, which the latter had refused, calling instead
either for a revote or for both candidates to drop out
in favor of a new election with new candidates, one of
whom presumably would be Moscow's current protege
Khashba. Khajimba responded to the Elder's decision by
appearing to back down for the first time, saying that
he would consult with his supporters before reaching a
decision. Meanwhile, Khashba threatened to resign as
prime minister if the supporters of both candidates did
not vacate the public property that they had seized and
disband their militia, and Ardzinba announced that he
would not vacate the presidency on December 6.
In response to Ardzinba's announcement,
parliament passed a resolution on November 26 declaring
Bagapsh's victory to be valid and demanding that the
State Guard Service "provide for the inauguration of the
president elect" on December 6. Khajimba labeled the
resolution "absurd" and Ardzinba's office announced that
the incumbent president had not instructed state
agencies to obey the parliamentary instructions.
Deputies in parliament who are opposed to Bagapsh
reported that 200 of his supporters had invaded the
chamber, demanding that their candidate's victory be
recognized.
Moscow hardens its
line With Moscow's strategy in a state of
collapse, Abkhazia appears to be headed for yet another
confrontation on December 6, when Bagapsh has vowed to
be inaugurated as president and Ardzinba has pledged to
remain in power. In order to head off a Bagapsh
takeover, Moscow, speaking through anonymous government
sources and Alexander Tkachov, governor of Krasnodar
territory, which borders Abkhazia, ratcheted up its
hardline rhetoric, threatening - if Bagapsh assumed the
presidency - to cut off pensions to Russian citizens in
Abkhazia and to close the country's border with Russia,
blocking the citrus exports and tourist trade that are
Abkhazia's major sources of income.
In a sharp
break from his previous pro-Russian position, Bagapsh
responded that if Moscow followed through on its
threats, Tbilisi would have an opportunity to restore
its control over Abkhazia, an opinion echoed by
Alexander Shakov, an analyst at the Russian Institute of
Strategic Research.
Thus far, Moscow's position
has been eased by the reluctance of the United Nations,
which monitors the ceasefire between Georgia and
Abkhazia, and the United States to intervene in the
conflict. Tbilisi, however, has sensed an advantage and
has stated that the "people's will" should prevail in
Abkhazia, a shift from its standard line that nothing
that transpires in the breakaway republic's political
system is legitimate or worthy of comment. Georgian
Minister for Conflict Resolution and Prevention Georgy
Khaindrava offered Sukhumi "the widest authority ever
known in international practice".
Tbilisi
believes that time is on its side. In a news conference
on November 24 celebrating the anniversary of the Rose
Revolution, Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili
noted that Georgia's budget in 2005 would be triple its
current figure, that much of the increased spending will
go to beef up the military and that NATO and the EU were
considering Georgia as a candidate for membership. With
reference to Abkhazia, Saakashvili said that "it is the
main goal and task of my life, my personal life", adding
that Tbilisi is getting ready to reassert sovereignty
over the breakaway region and that "we need patience"
but not "excessive pacifism".
The pitfalls of
neo-imperialism It is reasonable to conclude
that Moscow has acted to the detriment of its interests
in Abkhazia. The cause of the mini-state's institutional
failure and political implosion resides less in the
internal divisions of its society than in Moscow's
"neo-imperialist" policies. Like their neo-conservative
counterparts in Washington, the Russian neo-imperialists
are long on vision and short on a realistic appraisal of
actual conditions. Just as the neo-conservatives
believed that US forces would be welcomed in Iraq,
Moscow hardliners were confident that their favored
candidate would win in Abkhazia's contested election,
simply by dint of Putin's endorsement, government
control of the local media, the Abkhazian population's
pro-Russian attitudes and its dependency on Moscow, and
Moscow's campaign support. They did not reckon with the
large number of people in the mini-state who are
disaffected by a decade of economic depression, rampant
crime and corrupt rule, and were willing to back a
member of the established political class who promised
to bring reform while maintaining good relations with
Moscow.
When the election did not yield Moscow's
desired result, Putin could have accepted defeat and
turned it into an opportunity by playing the role of
honest broker and arranging the kind of deal that the
Council of Elders proposed and Bagapsh offered, allowing
Bagapsh to assume the presidency and giving the prime
minister's post to Khajimba. Instead, Moscow refused to
recognize its mistake and has continued to back the
losing side, now to the point of threatening the
population with severely punitive economic sanctions and
possible military coercion.
Moscow has stood by
and watched Abkhaz political society split apart,
counting on the resulting stress to bring its
adversaries and the general population around to heed
its dictates. Abkhazia's plunge into direct action and
political gang rule, verging on civil warfare, cancels
any possibility of a legitimized pro-Moscow regime
there. If Moscow succeeds in installing a president to
its liking in Sukhumi, his regime will be perceived as
an imposed domination both inside and outside Abkhazia.
If Bagapsh assumes the presidency, Moscow will either
institute punitive measures, driving Sukhumi to bargain
with Tbilisi, or it will have to mend fences with its
former opponent. The latter option is the only one that
is consistent with Russian interests, but it is not
clear that Putin will take it.
Moscow has
managed to cause a shift in attitudes that was
unthinkable before the October 3 election. Bagapsh, who
consistently asserted that Abkhazia had to be
pro-Russian, because if it was not, it would be
"swallowed" by Georgia, is now saying that Moscow is
forcing Abkhazia into Tbilisi's arms. Tbilisi is now
signaling that it will be generous to a "popular"
government in Sukhumi. It is a difficult feat to bring
Georgians and Abkhazians together after a bloody civil
war and ethnic cleansing, but it seems possible that
Moscow is doing just that.
The Euro-American
alliance stands to gain the most from Moscow's
mismanagement of Abkhazia, just as it does in Ukraine.
What appeared immediately after the October 3 election
to be a minor slippage in Russia's foothold in Abkhazia
has now become a slide that will be difficult to arrest.
Published with permission of thePower and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
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