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SPEAKING
FREELY
Hekmatyar: The wild card in
Afghanistan
By Shahin Eghraghi
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
Please click here if you
are interested in contributing.
There is
one major paradox in Iran's policy on Afghanistan: the
"release" of the notorious warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
in February 2002. On the one hand Iran needs a stable
Afghanistan to deal with vital issues such as drug
trafficking and the refugee problem, but also to nurture
the booming trade between Mashhad and Herat, where there
are regional plans to integrate Central Asia, Pakistan
and India; the routes of the ancient Silk Road. So why
did Iran unleash Hekmatyar, one of the most destructive
and destabilizing factors in modern Afghan history?
On the other hand, Iran is very much aware of
the "axis of evil" speech that was broadcast in Farsi by
no less than the recently appointed United States
ambassador to Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad. Hawks in the Bush
administration have since openly threatened Iran.
Therefore, many observers, including myself, believe
that Hekmatyar was released by Iran to deliberately
destabilize Afghanistan. Their decision could be seen as
a failure of US foreign policy.
The reason
for Iran to let Hekmatyar go was security, not for
Afghanistan, but for Iran. The Islamic Republic's main
concern is to 
be squeezed in between two US armies,
stationed right on its western and eastern borders (Iraq
and Afghanistan), with the option to strike at the whim
of hardliners in Washington. Therefore, one could argue
that by releasing Hekmatyar, the Islamic Republic
responded according to its security needs. The cost for
Afghan instability was considered a less concern than
the war threats from individuals in the Bush
administration.
It has also been reported that
Iran has reinstated and armed Hezb-e-Islami commanders
in Kandahar and Kunar [1] but I don't believe so. Iran
would run great risks of alienating itself from a
majority of the Afghan actors if it came out that while
arming both Ismail Khan, the Hazaras and the Panjshiris,
they were also arming Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami. One
observer thought that Hekmatyar would be used as a
Pashtun trump card for Iran, but in that case there are
more reliable Pashtuns, with less baggage, for Iran to
try to influence. [2]
However, one has to
acknowledge that Hekmatyar could not have left Iran and
crossed the border to suddenly show up in eastern
Afghanistan, without assistance from Iran's government.
It was Iran's Supreme National Security Council that
took the decision to expel Hekmatyar from his Iranian
exile and too many Iranian ministers were involved on
the issue for Hekmatyar to "disappear" unnoticed,
including Interior Minister Abdolvahed Mussavi-Lari,
Intelligence Minister Ali Yunessi and Foreign Minister
Kamal Kharrazi. While in Iran, Hekmatyar may have lived
low profile in his villa in northern Tehran, but one can
be sure that he was under strict surveillance by Iranian
intelligence - the Vevak [3].
So what is
Hekmatyar up to? Hezb-e-Islami strongholds are in his
native Kunduz; in western Takhar; and in the provinces
Kunar, Logar, Laghman and Wardak. In the Kabul area, his
main supporters are in his former military headquarters
in the southern Chahar Asiab district and in the eastern
Sarobi district, but there are also supporters in the
northwestern Shomali plains.
Not long ago he
declared a ceasefire with local commanders in Jalalabad,
Kunar, Logar and Sarobi, and stated that they should
"only fight foreigners". [4] However, considering that
ceasefires are not Hekmatyar's strong side, the
declaration should be seen as a purely tactical
decision. Nowadays he is considered militarily weak
given that most Hezb-e-Islami commanders joined the
ranks of the Taliban after he fled to Iran. The huge
stockpiles of weapons that the Hezbis assembled during
their partnership with the Central Intelligence Agency
have probably been disclosed to the Taliban, or looted,
by his former commanders.
Hekmatyar also seems
to have financial problems. Pakistani press has reported
that Hezbis have been selling off equipment in the
border areas to raise funds. This may explain the
activities in the north. In a recently published article
it is claimed that Hezb-e-Islami is controlling much of
the drug business in the northern Badakhshan province.
[5]
At the same time, other sources say that
Hekmatyar and presidential candidate and leader of the
Jamiat-e-Islami, Burhanuddin Rabbani, have held talks.
[6] Allegedly, Rabbani and Hekmatyar met in Badakhshan
last year and their representatives recently held talks
in neighboring Takhar province. Badakhshan is
traditionally a Jamiat stronghold and a province with
major opium production, and if Hezbis are going to run
any drug trafficking there, they must have some kind of
agreement with the Jamiat.
It is rumored that
the Hekmatyar-Rabbani talks are on mutual support: if
Hezbis can hide in Jamiat-controlled areas (and run
parts of the drug business), the Hezbis will put their
weight behind Rabbani in the upcoming presidential
elections. Until now, the political implications of
these talks are mere speculation, but the reported drug
trade should be taken seriously. The Hezbis are
generally known for their heroin business.
According to Barnett Rubin, Hekmatyar was the
only Afghan leader to exploit opium profits
systematically as a basis for a party and a conventional
army. Most commanders were content in selling raw opium,
but Hekmatyar also invested in laboratories in
partnership with Pakistani heroin syndicates. [7]
Here is another paradox in Iran's policy on
Hekmatyar: the Islamic Republic has during the past two
decades lost more than 3,000 men in clashes with heavily
armed traffickers on the Afghan and Pakistani borders.
Only during the first nine months of 2003, the Iranians
carried out 1,149 armed operations in their
counter-narcotics efforts. [8] The release of Hekmatyar
guaranteed more trouble in this area. Ironically,
narcotics is also one of two issues over which the US is
openly saying that it could cooperate with Iran, the
other issue being Iraq.
On Friday, November 7,
Operation Mountain Resolve was launched in the eastern
provinces of Nuristan and Kunar with an airdrop into the
Hindu Kush mountains by the US 10th Mountain Division.
So far it has resulted in the killing of Hezbi commander
Ghulam Sakhee [9], a few clashes, and the finding of
some minor weapon caches. It is difficult to assess
where Iran would fit into all of this, but I am certain
that the Islamic Republic, while through its passivity
helping Hekmatyar return to Afghanistan in 2002, also
decided to cut ties with him. The cost of being involved
with Hekmatyar is probably greater for Iran than any
long or short-term benefits. Iran's security concerns
can be dealt with by more peaceful means in cooperation
with the other main actors of the Afghan theater.
Hekmatyar's intentions were clarified in
February 2002 when he declared: "We prefer involvement
in internal war rather than occupation by foreigners and
foreign troops". [10] Regardless of Hekmatyar's
political ambitions, civil war is beneficial for him
since he is probably eager to gain more control of the
heroin trade, which is more profitable in a time of
conflict. The US and Pakistan nurtured and encouraged
Hekmatyar for many years and are ultimately responsible
for creating the Hekmatyar of today. Iran indeed made a
mistake by releasing him, but the US made a mistake by
threatening Iran. Regardless of who carries the most
guilt, Hekmatyar's ambitions for Afghanistan will in the
end affect ordinary Afghan civilians negatively.
Hopefully he will be difficult to replace.
Hekmatyar chronology
1947:
Born in Imam Saheb, Kunduz Province (Afghanistan).
1970: Joins the Muslim Youth while studying
engineering in Kabul (Afghanistan).
1972-1973:
Imprisoned by the king.
1973: The Daoud coup.
Hekmatyar escapes to Pakistan and is recruited by
Pakistani intelligence - the Inter-Services
Intelligence.
1975: Hekmatyar becomes leader of
the Hezb-e-Islami.
1979: Mulavi Younas Khalis
splits with Hekmatyar and establishes his own
Hezb-e-Islami, known as the Khalis-faction, with its
powerbase in Nangarhar.
1979-1992: Fighting the
Soviets and its puppet regime. Receives massive funding
from Pakistan and the US, including Stinger missiles.
1992-1996: Civil war and power struggle with
Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. From 1994
also with the Taliban.
1995: Abandons his
headquarters in Chahar Asiab to the southeast of Kabul
due to Taliban pressure.
May 1996: Joins with
Rabbani and Massoud and becomes prime minister.
September 1996: Hekmatyar exiled in Iran after
the fall of Kabul to the Taliban.
May 1998:
Hekmatyar returns briefly to Mazar-e-Sharif.
September 18, 2001: Hekmatyar sides with Osama
Bin Laden. (BBC)
October 5, 2001: Hekmatyar
warns Pakistan for siding with US. (Pravda)
October 26, 2001: Hekmatyar "in talks with
Taliban". (BBC)
January 29, 2002: US President
George W Bush's State of the Union speech to Congress
declaring Iran part of the "axis of evil".
February 10, 2002: All the offices of
Hezb-e-Islami are closed in Iran. (BBC)
February
24, 2002: Afghan leader Hamid Karzai arrives in Iran for
a thee-day visit after having visited Pakistan, the
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, the former
backers of the Taliban. (IPS)
February 26, 2002:
IRNA says that Hekmatyar has left Tehran. (BBC)
March 11, 2002: Hekmatyar pledges support for
Karzai, through his deputy, Qutbuddin Hilal. The party
also supports the return of the king. (BBC)
May
2002: A reported failed assassination attempt by the CIA
in the Shegal Gorge near Kabul. Missile from unmanned
spy plane missed. (BBC)
October 2002: US is
reported behind the arrest of Hekmatyar's son-in-law and
Hezb-e-Islami spokesperson, Ghairat Baheer, in
Islamabad. (BBC)
February 10, 2003: Reports say
Hekmatyar in alliance with al-Qaeda and Taliban.
(Guardian)
October 31, 2003: Two of Hekmatyar's
commanders, Abu Bakr from Logar and Commander Qalam from
Khost, are reported to have been arrested recently in
Kabul by International Security Assistance Forces. (The
News)
October 31, 2003: It is reported that
talks have been held between Rabbani and Hekmatyar
representatives in Takhar province. The two rivals have
allegedly also spoken in Badakhshan in 2002. (The News,
BBC)
October 31, 2003: Militarily and
politically weak Khalis, of the other Hezb-e-Islami
faction, declares jihad against foreigners. (PakTribune)
November 7, 2003: US Operation Mountain Resolve
is launched in Nuristan and Kunar, two possible hideouts
for Hekmatyar.
November 29, 2003: Zalmay
Khalilzad becomes US ambassador to Kabul.
November 29, 2003: A Hekmatyar commander, Ghulam
Sakhee, is killed in Kunar according to province
governor. (Khaleej Times)
December 11, 2003: BBC
in Pakistan receives a video tape where Hekmatyar boasts
of evading the US.
Notes
[1] Iran acts against anti-US Afghan fighters,
Asia Times 2002-02-12.
[2] Iran's unlikely
bedfellow, BBC 2002-02-10.
[3] Vazerat-e
Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar or Ministry of Information
and State Security (author's translation). Unlike other
countries, Iranian intelligence is a ministry, not an
organization.
[4] A war short on substance, long
on form, Asia Times 2003-10-08.
[5] US plans on
al-Qaeda's Afghan opium, Guardian 2003-11-24.
[6] Ex-mujahideen Afghan leaders said joining
hands against "foreign forces", The News 2003-10-31.
[7] Page 257, The Fragmentation of
Afghanistan, 2nd edition, Barnett R Rubin, Yale
University Press, 2002.
[8] According to report
from the Iranian Drug Control Headquarters, 2003-11-19.
[9] Rebel military commander killed in eastern
Afghanistan, Khaleej Times/AFGHA 2003-11-29.
[10] Iran, Afghanistan Juggle Hot Potato
Hekmatyar, Time 2002-02-23.
Shahin
Eghraghi served in the Swedish detachment to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul
until September 2003. He is currently a Research
Assistant with the Program for Contemporary Silk Road
Studies at Uppsala University, where his main duties are
research into drug trafficking and security issues in
Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their say.
Please click here if you
are interested in contributing.
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