| |
Why
the US needs the Taliban
By Ramtanu Maitra
Since Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf made his much-acclaimed
visit to Camp David and met US President George W Bush on June 24, new elements
have begun to emerge in the Afghan theater. US troops in Afghanistan are now
encountering more enemy attacks than ever before, and clashes between Pakistani
and Afghan troops along the tribal borders have been reported regularly.
On July 16, speaking to Electronic Telegraph of the United Kingdom, US troop
commander General Frank "Buster" Hagenbeck, based at Bagram Air Base in
Afghanistan, reported increased attacks over recent weeks on US and Afghan
forces by the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other anti-US groups that have joined
hands. He also revealed some other very interesting information: the Taliban
and its allies have regrouped in Pakistan and are recruiting fighters from
religious schools in Quetta in a campaign funded by drug trafficking. Hagenbeck
also said that these enemies of US and Afghan forces have been joined by
Al-Qaeda commanders who are establishing new cells and sponsoring the attempted
capture of American troops. One other piece of news of import from Hagenbeck is
that the Taliban have seized whole swathes of the country.
Reliable intelligence
Hagenbeck's statements were virtually ignored in Washington. Also ignored were
a number of similar statements issued from Kabul by Afghan President Hamid
Karzai and his cabinet colleagues. On July 17, presidential spokesman Jawed
Ludin spoke to the Pakistani newspaper The News of the Afghan government's
concern over the volatile situation on its border with Pakistan. Ludin urged
Pakistan to "take steps" to prevent the Taliban fighters from crossing over to
launch terrorist attacks against Kabul. "We will take it seriously to confront
it," he warned. "So our expectation is for all those involved in the war
against terror to take serious steps," Ludin added, clearly addressing the Bush
administration.
A week later, on July 24, in an article for The Nation, a Pakistani news daily,
Ahmed Rashid, the well known expert on the Taliban and Afghanistan, quoted
President Hamid Karzai, during an interview at Kabul, as saying: "As much as we
want good relations with Pakistan and other neighbors, we also oppose
extremism, terrorism and fundamentalism coming into Afghanistan from outside.
We have one page where there is a tremendous desire for friendship and the need
for each other. But there is the other page, of the consequences if
intervention continues, cross-border terrorism continues, violence and
extremism continue. Afghans will have no choice but to stand up and stop it."
Among Americans, only the special
envoy of the US president to Afghanistan and a good
friend of President Karzai, Zalmay Khalilzad, has shown
any concern about the recent developments. Khalilzad has
little choice but to keep up a bold front to the
Afghans, telling them how his bosses in Washington are
doing their best to rebuild Afghanistan, and attributes
the present crisis to the security situation. Like
everyone else, Khalilzad has little in reality to offer
and, given the opportunity, falls back on what "must be
done" and "should be done". At a July 15 press
conference at Kabul, Khalilzad said every effort has to
be made by Pakistan not to allow its territory to be
used by the Taliban elements. This "should not be
allowed", he said. "We need 100 percent assurances [from
Pakistan] on this, not 50 percent assurances, and we
know the Taliban are planning in Quetta."
What is happening? Both Hagenbeck, who boasts
to the media about the high quality of his intelligence, and Khalilzad, who is
unquestionably in a position to know, have stated that the Taliban and al-Qaeda
are being nurtured, not in some inaccessible terrain along the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border but in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's
Balochistan province where the Pakistan Army and the ISI have a major presence.
Yet, President Bush and his neo-conservative henchmen have remained strangely
quiet, allowing Pakistan to strengthen the Taliban in Quetta, and, as a
consequence, re-energize al-Qaeda - the killers of thousands of Americans in
the fall of 2001.
Recall for a moment: Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United
States, no other terrorist was portrayed by the United States as more dangerous
than al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and no other Islamic fundamentalist group
was presented to the American people as more despicable than the Taliban.
Within a month the United States invaded Afghanistan to "take out" the Taliban,
al-Qaeda and bin Laden, while the world lined up behind the new anti-terrorist
messiahs from Washington, providing it the necessary moral and vocal support.
Why, then, is Washington now weakening President Karzai and allowing the
strengthening and re-emergence of the Taliban?
Karzai shared with Ahmed Rashid his belief, like that of the average Afghan
today, that the answer to that question lies in an understanding reached
between the United States and Pakistan during Musharraf's visit to Camp David,
that Afghanistan could be, in effect, "sub-contracted" to Pakistan. Karzai also
told Rashid that Musharraf's critical remarks about the Karzai regime during
his visit to the United States reminded him of the pre-September 11 days when
Pakistan was fully backing the Taliban and exercising ever-more-strident
control over Afghanistan. Musharraf had said, among other things, that the
Afghan president does not have much control over Afghanistan beyond Kabul. But,
Karzai added in the interview with Rashid, no matter what the outsiders are
planning or plotting, as of now, "I want nobody to be under any illusion that
Afghanistan will allow any other country to control it." Is Karzai
overreacting? Most likely, he is not. He has seen the writing on the wall. It
is arguable whether the Taliban's return to power is inevitable, but there is
little doubt that under the circumstances it is very convenient for the US.
Bowing to realities
To begin with, it was clear from the outset that the United States never really
wanted to be in Afghanistan. It was basically a jumping-off point for the "big
enchilada", the re-shaping of the Middle East's politics and regimes. The
Afghan reconstruction talk was mostly wishful thinking. For anyone familiar
with present-day Afghanistan - its security situation, the drug production and
trafficking, its destroyed infrastructure, its rampant illiteracy and poverty -
its reconstruction by foreigners is either a dream or a string of motivated
lies.
Now, after a half-hearted effort that lasted for almost 18 months, the Bush
administration has come to realize that it is impossible to keep Pakistan as a
friend and simultaneously keep the Northern Alliance-backed government in power
in Kabul. The "puppet" Pashtun leader in Kabul, Hamid Karzai, does not have the
approval of Pakistan and the majority of the rest of the Pashtun community
straddling both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. So, either one has
Pakistan as a friend with an Islamabad-backed Pashtun group in power in Kabul,
or one gets Pakistan as an enemy. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind how
the Bush administration would act when confronted with such a choice.
Secondly, look at the Northern Alliance (NA) allies. The best ally of the NA is
Russia, the Bush administration's key contestant for supremacy in Central Asia.
In the 1980s, the United States spent billions of dollars to get Afghanistan
out of the Russian orbit. It is ridiculous to believe that the Bush
administration would act differently now to protect the NA and Karzai. Much
better is to have Afghanistan sub-contracted to Pakistan and keep the Russians
at bay, than to yield ground to Moscow, who is hardly friendly to Pakistan.
Thirdly, the NA, and particularly the Shi'ites of the Hazara region of
Afghanistan, are close to Iran. Iran is building a road which will connect the
Iranian port of Chahbahar to the city of Herat in central Afghanistan and link
up with Kandahar in the southeast. While this is going on, some
neo-conservatives in Washington are screaming for Iranian blood. Even if the
Bush administration is not quite willing right now to spill that blood, it is
nonetheless a certainty that Washington will be more than eager to see the
Iranian influence in Afghanistan curbed. If the NA-backed Karzai government
stays in power for long, Iran would most definitely enhance its influence. The
Taliban do not want that and they have sent a message recently by slaughtering
the Shi'ites in Quetta with the full knowledge of the Pakistani authorities.
Besides being anti-Russia, the Taliban are also anti-Shi'ite, or anti-Iran.
This added "virtue" of the Taliban has not gone unnoticed in the corridors of
intrigue-makers in Washington.
Finally, there is the India factor. A minor factor, it does, however, come into
play in calculating the pluses and minuses of the resurgent Taliban option. The
Bush administration wants closer relations with India - not on New Delhi's
terms, but on Washington's terms. Indian activity in Afghanistan has increased
multifold since the Karzai government came to power in the winter of 2001.
These developments are being eyed suspiciously by Islamabad. While Washington
would not make a federal case out of it, it surely does not like to see India
forming a strategic alliance with Russia and Iran in Afghanistan. Washington
would rather like to break such an alliance quickly, particularly if its ally,
in this case Pakistan, wants such an alliance broken. Significantly, a
well-connected relative of Musharraf, Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan, formerly at
the Wilson Center and now a fellow at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies, addressed these issues directly in a recent publication.
Not just whistling in the dark
In the January issue of Strategic Insight, a publication for the Center for
Contemporary Conflict, Khan observed: "In Iran, President Khatami is moving in
tandem and cooperation with Pakistan in supporting the Karzai government as
manifest in the recent visit to Pakistan. However there are hardliners in Iran
who would want to continue with the old game of supporting warlords and
factions and consider Pakistan as rival vis-a-vis Afghanistan, and who are
still suspicious of the Saudi role. Iran is pitching its bid, by constructing a
road from Chahbahar Port in the Persian Gulf through Iran's Balochistan area to
link up eventually with Kandahar in the hope of 'breaking the monopoly of
Pakistan'. Afghanistan is currently sustained primarily through the
Karachi-Quetta/Peshawar routes - Bolan and Khyber passes respectively - which
has provided Afghanistan with trade and transit with the outside world for
centuries."
Furthermore, Khan pointed out, "Russia remains involved with the major warlords
[of Afghanistan]. One such warlord, Rashid Dostum, was recently on a shopping
spree for arms and equipment from Moscow. Russia believes it has its own
experience and expertise in Afghanistan and must reestablish its interests.
Given the history, Pakistan is very uncomfortable with this development."
Of course, the Khan's treatise would not have been complete without pointing to
the devious role of the Indians in Afghanistan. He said: "India is a major
proactive player now. It is providing well-coordinated military supplies to the
Northern Alliance thorough the air base in Tajikistan. This includes weapons,
equipment and spare parts aimed at strengthening those elements that had become
the sworn enemies of Pakistan during the Taliban's rule. Fear in Pakistan is
that despite Afghanistan's changed policies, some elements still hold a grudge
against Pakistan and would be willing to do India's bidding. This would bring
the India-Pakistan rivalry into the Afghan imbroglio."
It is safe to assume that Khan, who has an extensive background in arms
control, disarmament and international treaties, and who formulated Pakistan's
security policy on nuclear war, arms control and strategic stability in South
Asia, is not merely whistling in the dark.
The terms of convenience
Now the question remains, what might Pakistan be expected to deliver in return
for the Bush administration granting it control over Afghanistan once more? In
the real world, Pakistan can help the United States significantly. It has
already agreed not to provide nuclear technology to Islamic nations. Musharraf
may have to give the United States control of its nuclear research facility,
among other things. More important will be to hand over Osama bin Laden to the
United States and send two brigades of Pakistani troops to Iraq to help out the
beleaguered US troops there. The arrest of Osama would surely justify the US
mission to Afghanistan, and could set the stage for America's eventual
withdrawal from that country. Another likely item on the agenda is Pakistani
recognition of Israel.
Would this new arrangement of "sub-contracting" (to use Karzai's apt term)
Afghanistan to the Pakistan-Taliban combination complicate the already complex
situation any further? Probably not. It was evident in October 2001, when the
United States went pell-mell into Afghanistan with the help of the Northern
Alliance, that America's hastily-organized arrangement there was unsustainable.
It was clear that no matter what Islamabad says, or how much pressure is
brought to bear on it, Pakistan has absolutely no reason whatsoever to agree to
such an arrangement.
Washington came to appreciate the non-sustainability of this arrangement when
Musharraf, in a sleight of hand, brought the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal - the MMA,
also known as "Musharraf, Mullahs and the Army" - to power in the two provinces
bordering Afghanistan. At that point, Karzai's tenure as president of
Afghanistan shrank abruptly, and Washington deemed it time to give up the
"Marshall Plan for Afghanistan" and settle for next best - Taliban rule in
Afghanistan under Pakistani control, once again.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
content@atimes.com for information on our
sales and syndication policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
