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Putin: The incredibly shrinking
president
By Peter Lavelle
Is
President Vladimir Putin slowly but surely losing his
Teflon veneer, or is the true nature of Russia's
political economy simply becoming more apparent? Events
over the past few months would seem to attest that both
propositions are correct. Putin's Teflon relies heavily
on public relations and an acute tenacity in avoiding
policy debate in public. In domestic affairs, Putin
almost always sides with the predetermined winner. In
foreign policy, his turn to the West has clearly
irritated members of the state bureaucracy, but, then
again, the most powerful domestic business concerns
support this policy reorientation.
Thus, a very
impolite question is in need of an answer: Does Vladimir
Putin really matter? In early May, during his annual
address to the federal assembly, he will have to explain
why he is losing his struggle to fundamentally change
Russia, as well as defend the importance of the office
of president of the Russian Federation.
Over the
past few months, the limits of what public relations can
do for the Kremlin have been put to the test, and
results have been mediocre. The Kremlin's expectations
that America's war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq would
end in a catastrophe have given Putin a black eye. The
political assassination of Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov
- a prominent liberal and perpetual thorn in the side of
the political forces Putin has supported and even
reluctantly protected - has hurt him further, as no one
expects the culprit(s) of this act to be found as long
as the security forces are in charge of the
investigation. To add insult to injury, Putin is
sporting a broken lip with the rise of YukosSibneft, an
oil corporate heavyweight that will cast a long and
powerful shadow across Russian politics. The Kremlin's
usual backpedaling on economic reform as late tops off
Putin's travails.
There is no doubt that Putin
has found himself on the defensive over the past few
months. Just about everything, be it domestic economic
reform or foreign policy initiatives, has gone off
course or stalled for the president. And Putin is
virtually nowhere to be found as Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov's cabinet squabbles itself into a standstill.
Putin has no meaningful public stance when it comes to
tax policy and the recent legislative battle over
military reform. The most important cabinet official
supporting creative reform, Minister of Economic
Development and Trade German Gref, is in the process of
being hounded out of office due to a combination of
Kasyanov's ineptness and Putin's unwillingness to stomp
his foot in favor of Gref's agenda - an agenda that is
supposed to reflect Putin's publicly expressed hope of
transforming the economy.
The saving grace that
keeps Russia's political elite afloat and the country's
business leaders from starting an all-out assault on one
other is the extraordinary influx of ruble liquidity,
creating a sense of increasing affluence for the
oligarchs and what is called Russia's "middle class".
This limits the imperative for conflict with the state.
At present, Putin the politician can take credit for
stabilizing and enriching Russia for the lucky few. The
super-rich have no real and pressing grievances at the
moment as well - they are the ones who are being
fabulously enriched as over a third of the population
lives in abject poverty. During a time when those most
interested in politics are making money hand over fist,
the call to battle appears to be unnecessary. Or this
seemed to be the case before the American war against
Iraq, the murder of a high-profile member of the
political opposition and, most importantly, the rise of
the mega-oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky - signaling that
the pecking order of Russia's business world has finally
been secured. This makes the state appear less and less
relevant in the areas in which it has a mandate: foreign
policy, public order and regulation of the market.
Putin is a net loser in all three areas and, at
the very least, this tells us something about his
political role and the nature of Russia's presidency in
general. Putin clearly was given some bum advice on
America's chances of effecting "regime change" in Iraq.
The "coalition of the unwilling" with the French and
Germans, while noble, was a foreign policy initiative
that bordered on naivety and stubbornness. And, in the
face of all logic, the Ministry of Defense's plans for
military reform will come to pass - the same military
that forecast defeat of American forces in Iraq and
cannot achieve victory in chaotic Chechnya. Putin's
virtual silence on this issue is a reflection either of
a low learning curve or that his hands are tied.
The murder of Sergei Yushenkov is telling as to
Russia's current political culture. The death appears to
be much more than a random act of violence or revenge.
It was most probably a political murder ordered by
someone in authority - someone untouchable. Even for
those not overtly interested in politics, Putin's
proclamation of a vision of "dictatorship of law" must
ring very hollow right now: No major politically related
crime has been solved for years, and nothing in the
present political order appears to be moving to reverse
this trend. Looking back over the past few years - the
Putin presidency - it appears obvious that the
"dictatorship of law" applies to those who cannot
protect themselves or who have been rejected by those
who control the levers of power.
The
Yukos-Sibneft merger is the most glaring reason to
wonder about just what the value of Putin and the
Russian presidency in the country's political
environment really is. From the start of Putin's term,
there was a Kremlin attempt to keep the oligarchs
equally distant form the corridors of power as well as
prevent them from joining forces against the Kremlin.
The merger of Yukos and Sibneft is a complete refutation
of Putin's original "divide and rule" approach to those
who wish to make the state irrelevant or, at most, a
paid employee. The new YukosSibneft may help protect
Russia's international petroleum interests, but it is
hard to see how it can promote reform at home.
To date, Putin's "quiet revolution" has reined
in the country's regional governors, installed numerous
security officials in high government positions and, for
all intends and purposes, resurrected the KGB. This has
affected everyone in Russia except those who can afford
to pay off the state. It would appear that the essence
of Putin and his presidency is to keep the little folks
under control while others live above and beyond the law
of the land. It seems Russia does not need a president;
it just needs a public relations-driven facilitator to
keep the masses in line.
When Putin addresses
the Federal Assembly next month, it will not be
important which Russian oil company's insignia will be
found proudly emblazoned on his chest. What will be of
interest is if anyone will be able to see Russia's
incredibly shrinking president on the chamber's podium.
Peter Lavelle is a Moscow-based
analyst and author of the weekly e-newsletter Untimely
Thoughts.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd.
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