| |
Iron fist leaves no room to move in
Chechnya
By Hooman Peimani
According to the Russian Emergency Situations
Ministry, more than 40 people were killed and more than
60 wounded on December 27 when two Chechen suicide
bombers drove two trucks containing explosives into the
Chechen government compound in Chechnya's capital,
Grozny. The attackers' ability to pass through three
security cordons around the compound reflected the
inability of the Russian security forces to ensure even
the security of the pro-Moscow republican government,
despite the massive and brutal suppression of Chechen
separatists, the blatant human rights abuses by the
Russian military in Chechnya, and several dismissals of
the Russian military commanders there.
Undoubtedly, the bombing was a clear case of
security failure of the Russian forces stationed in the
republic, although the two pro-Moscow high-ranking
republican officials, Akhmed Kadyrov (head of the
republican government) and Mikhail Babyche (his deputy)
were not in the compound at the time of incident. Being
the house of Chechnya's government, the severely damaged
compound was reportedly protected by three security
cordons established by Russian forces.
In his
reaction to the incident in Moscow, where he was at the
time of bombing, Kadyrov expressed his shock and
requested an investigation into the actions of the
security forces around the compound, as he stated, "How
could the terrorists have managed to break through three
fences around the government building?" However, he
reportedly did not call for increased security measures
in Grozny on the grounds of the futility of such
measures, including checking cars through road blocks,
to prevent further attacks, given the ability of Chechen
"terrorists" to act as if they are "masters of Grozny",
as evident in their operations in that city.
Apart from the heavy casualties and severe
damage to the compound, the attack on the Chechen
government compound was a major embarrassment for the
Russian government. Prior to the incident, the Kremlin
insisted on the Russian forces' military success in
Chechnya and on its putting the republic on the path of
normalcy, a situation promising the end of the military
operation there in the near future. Based on that
argument, on December 18, the Russian government turned
down the Russian parliament's call for a state of
emergency in Chechnya. However, the December 27 attack
clearly proved otherwise. Particularly, the choice of
target and the success of the attackers demonstrated the
operational capability of the anti-Moscow Chechen
militants as well as their determination to pursue their
cause, ie, independence for Chechnya.
The
failure of the Russian government to restore its
authority in the breakaway republic has not been
confined to the mentioned case only. In fact, Moscow has
failed to achieve that objective through use of brute
force since 1991 when the fall of the Soviet Union
triggered the independence movement in Chechnya. After
tolerating the latter's practical independence for about
three years, the Russian massive military campaign in
1994, which lasted until 1996, only resulted in heavy
casualties for both sides to the conflict without
securing the Russian objective of ending the
independence movement in Chechnya. In the end, Moscow
had to accept for a while (although not officially) the
irritating status quo - the republic's practical
independence.
Beginning in 1999, the second
military campaign to secure the same objective has only
brought about a self-declared success for the Russian
government. Through its massive use of force, including
heavy land and aerial bombardments, in a few months the
Russian troops forced the Chechen armed groups to
retreat from indefensible cities and to change their
tactics. Lacking heavy weapons, they have since avoided
classical warfare with Russian troops. Instead, they
have resorted to small-scale hit-and-run operations
against Russian forces all over Chechnya, and even in
its neighboring Republic of Dagestan, from strongholds
in the mountains and the countryside.
Seeking to
increase the cost of Moscow's effort to keep Chechnya
within its territory, the armed Chechen groups have
inflicted constant losses in human lives and military
hardware on the Russian military, pro-Moscow Chechens
and police forces through their attacks on small
concentrations of those targets and through their
ambushes on Russian military convoys. Their significant
use of anti-aircraft missiles since 2002 has challenged
the Russian military's air superiority, as reflected in
the shooting down of many Russian military helicopters
in that year.
The numerous reported abuses of
human rights by the Russian forces against the civilian
and armed Chechens alike have failed to end the Chechen
independence movement about four years after the
beginning of the latest military campaign, although it
has certainly pushed many formerly reluctant Chechens
toward the armed groups. Since 1999, the Russian forces
have controlled the cities mainly during the day while
seeking shelter in their barracks at night for fear of
constant Chechen attacks. They have proved unable to
control Chechnya as a whole and to ensure the allegiance
of its population to Moscow.
The Kremlin's
agonizing inability to end the armed separatist movement
through its costly military operation has resulted in
the dismissals of many commanders of the Russian forces
in Chechnya who have blamed for the bitter reality.
However, such policy has failed to change the pace of
events in Moscow's favor. As a recent example, on
December 18, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed
Colonel General Gennady Troshev and handed over his
position to Colonel General Vladimir Boldyrev.
Against this background, the December attack on
the Chechen government's compound should not surprise
anyone, especially because it took place after a major
bombing of a police station in Grozny in October during
which at least 25 people were killed. However, the
ability of the attackers to bypass the Russian security
forces is definitely a matter of surprise, both for
indicating the weakness of the Russian military's
security arrangement in Grozny and also for its timing.
The attack happened about two months after the
surprising October takeover of a theater in Moscow by
Chechen militants.
The Chechen conflict since
1991 has proven that Moscow's resort to extensive use of
force can only turn Chechnya's cities, including Grozny,
into rubble, while leaving its objective unachievable.
Although the Russian government has a right to preserve
its territorial integrity, the decade-long negative
experience of its high-handed approach toward Chechnya
should convince it that unless the root causes of
separatism are addressed, its iron fist policy will only
deepen mistrust and hostility between the Chechens and
the Russians. The latter will surely prolong the
devastating war in Chechnya and will delay the finding
of a mutually acceptable peaceful settlement to the
Chechen conflict.
Dr Hooman Peimani
works as an independent consultant with international
organizations in Geneva and does research in
international relations.
(©2003 Asia Times
Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
